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Thirty Years of Environmental Protection
Law in the Supreme Court
RICHARD  J.  LAZARUS*
It is an honor to present a lecture named after Lloyd Garrison
and  to  be  here  at  Pace  Law  School.  It  is  especially  fitting,  of
course, that the  first  Garrison  Lecture  was presented  by  Pace's
own David  Sive.  Professor  Sive,  as we  all know, worked  closely
with Garrison  on  the celebrated  Scenic Hudson litigation.1  Few
legal counsel have been so closely identified with the emergence of
the environmental  law profession  during the past three  decades.
Indeed, if there were such a thing as a legal thesaurus that linked
substantive areas of law with lawyers and one looked up "environ-
Copyright  ©  1999 Pace University School  of Law; Richard J.  Lazarus
*  John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
This article  and the underlying factual information was  first presented at Pace Law
School on March 11,  1999,  as the Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environ-
mental  Law,  but has been updated  in  light of a few events occurring  subsequent to
that presentation.  Because this lecture  does not lend itself to a full presentation of
the statistical  compilation  of United States Supreme  Court  rulings underlying  the
lecture or to a complete elaboration  of the related analysis, that fuller version is being
separately  published.  See  Richard  J.  Lazarus,  Restoring What's "Environmental"
About  Environmental Law  in  the Supreme Court, 47  U.C.L.A.  L.  Rav.  703  (2000).
Special thanks are owed to Staci Krupp, J.D. Candidate 2000,  Georgetown University
Law Center, and Alex  Steffan, J.D.  1999,  Georgetown University  Law  Center, who
provided  excellent research  assistance  in the preparation  of the initial  lecture  and
this article.  This article discusses Supreme Court decisions in many cases, including
some  in  which  I served  as counsel  for parties  involved  in the litigation.  The views
expressed in  this article are my own and  do not necessarily reflect the views of those
parties I represented.
1.  Scenic Hudson Preservation  Conference  v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d  Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.  941 (1966).
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mental  law,"  its  first  synonym  would  undoubtedly  be  "David
Sive."
2
I do not and could not, however, make claim to the extraordi-
nary pedigree of David Sive: One of the first of the very first gen-
eration of modern environmental lawyers in this country.  Nor can
a fair comparison  be made to the other three Garrison Lecturers
who  preceded  me:  Professors  Joe  Sax,  Bill  Rodgers,  and  Oliver
Houck.  These are true pioneers.  They inspired  much  in the for-
mation of modern environmental  protection law, and have served
since  in  their  scholarship  and  their  legal  counsel  as  the  law's
guardians  and promoters.
But what I strive to claim is a close lineage, as the first of the
second  generation  of environmental  lawyers  and  scholars  to  de-
liver  this  lecture.  I  use the term  "lineage" deliberately.  For al-
though I did not then know any of them by name, it was the work
of Lloyd Garrison, David Sive, and the others that resulted in my
own decision to engage in the study and practice of environmental
law.
I made my decision to become an environmental  lawyer dur-
ing my  freshman year in  college  in  1971,  because  of the events
then occurring in our nation.  Like many of my contemporaries in
environmental law, I saw  as my role models those environmental
law activists who seemed to be shaping the nation's future in nec-
essary and positive ways.  So it should be no surprise that I feel a
great debt to those who preceded  me as Garrison lecturers, and to
Lloyd Garrison, whom I never had the pleasure to meet.
As much as I deliberately, if not obsessively, struck a path of
becoming  an  environmental  lawyer  and  law  professor  twenty-
eight years ago, the actual  direction  of that path has necessarily
been  the result  of much  happenstance  and  fortuity.  One  bit  of
good  fortune  has been  my consistent  involvement  with the  U.S.
Supreme Court, both as a practicing lawyer and a legal academic.3
This  lecture  stems  from  that work  by examining  the  Supreme
Court's  role  in  environmental  law's  evolution  during  the  past
2.  Professor  Sive  is often referred  to as the "father of environmental  law."  See
Margaret  Cronin  Fisk,  Profiles in Power 100-The Most  Influential Lawyers in
America, NAT'L  L.J., March 25,  1991,  at S2.
3.  I joined the Department of Justice in the fall of 1979, after law school gradua-
tion.  The Court soon after granted  review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980),  for which I was assigned responsibility for drafting the position of the United
States as amicus curiae. Since then, I have had the opportunity to represent the fed-
eral government, state and local governments, and environmental  groups in a host of
cases before  the Supreme Court.
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thirty years, as reflected in the Court's  decisions and the votes of
the individual Justices.  My view is that those decisions  and votes
increasingly  suggest a lack of appreciation  of environmental  law
as a distinct area of law.
This  lecture's  objectives  are three-fold.  The first  is perhaps
somewhat  pedantic, but both revealing and even entertaining for
those (like me) who are preoccupied with the Court.  It  is to high-
light some facts and figures about the past thirty years of environ-
mental and natural resources law cases before the Court that tell
much about the Court and the individual Justices.
The second objective is to suggest what the Court's decisions
tell us about the nature and practice of environmental  law.  This
includes how environmental law relates to other areas of law with
which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects.  It  also includes les-
sons regarding how, accordingly, law students who seek to become
environmental lawyers should approach the study of law.  It  like-
wise  extends  to  how  environmental  lawyers  seeking  to  promote
environmental  protection  and  resource  conservation  can  be  the
most effective in litigation.
The third and final objective is more modest.  It  is to describe
a potentially  significant case that the Court heard during the Oc-
tober 1999 Term.  The case was important  because  at stake was
the future  role  of citizen  suit enforcement in environmental  law,
which  has  long  been  one  of  environmental  law's  essential
hallmarks.4  More  broadly, however,  the  case  proved  significant
because it provided the Court with a much needed opportunity to
reverse  the  disturbing trend  discernible  in its  precedent  and  to
restore what is "environmental" about environmental  law.
I.  A Scorecard  Of The Justices' Votes In Environmental
Cases
Commencing  with the  Supreme  Court's  October  Term  1969,
the  Court  has  decided  over  240  environmental  and natural  re-
sources  law cases  on the merits.5  There  are  a host of intriguing
4.  See CITIZEN  SUITS:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  CITIZEN  ENFORCEMENT  ACTIONS  UNDER
EPA ADMINISTERED  STATUTES (Environmental  Law Institute  1984).
5.  A listing of the cases is included in an appendix to this article.  Whether a case
is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes of this threshold inquiry turns
on whether environmental  protection or natural  resources matters are at stake.  The
legal issue before the Court need not independently have an environmental character
to it.  The stakes themselves  are sufficient to invoke the label.  The Garrison Lecture
upon which this article  is based was delivered on March  11,  1999.  Since then, the
Supreme Court has decided two additional  environmental cases, City of Monterey v.
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factual  inquiries that could  be undertaken  concerning  these rul-
ings.  This lecture, however,  focuses on only three: (1) which Jus-
tices wrote the most decisions for the Court during the past thirty
years;  (2) which Justices have been in the majority the most fre-
quently;  and  (3) which Justices  have tended  to vote  for outcomes
that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather
than more).
A.  Justice White:  The Justice Who Wrote the Most
Environmental  Decisions  For the Court
In tallying which Justice has written the most environmental
opinions  for  the  Court  during  the past thirty years,  one  might
fairly anticipate that the  opinions  would  be split roughly  evenly
with  Chief Justice  Rehnquist  leading  the  pack.  After  all,  the
Chief Justice  has  served  longer  on the  Court than anyone  pres-
ently there  and his tenure virtually spans  the relevant  time  pe-
riod, with his joining the Court as a Justice in 1971.  But it is in
fact neither  the  Chief Justice  leading the  pack  nor  is  it  even  a
close question as to who has written the most environmental opin-
ions for the  Court.  Nineteen Justices  have  served on  the  Court
during the relevant time period6 and Justice White, who left the
Court  in  1993,  is  the  leading  opinion writer  for the  Court  by  a
large margin.
Justice White  wrote thirty-six  opinions.  The  next  closest  is
Justice O'Connor with twenty-two opinions for the Court.  How is
that  revealing?  What  philosophy  does  one  think  about  Justice
White and environmental  protection?  The fairest answer is none
at all.
Justice White harbored no particular interest in environmen-
tal law.  His opinions are dispassionate,  dry, and formalistic, with
little  effort  to  elaborate  any  particular  philosophical  vision.  In
this respect, moreover, his environmental  law opinions  do not dif-
fer from his opinions for the Court generally, which a recent biog-
Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624  (1999),  and Amoco Production  Co. v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999), which have been added to the database and, when rele-
vant, to the discussion in the text of this article.
6.  These  Justices  are: Harlan,  Black, Douglas, Stewart,  Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,  Gins-
burg, and Breyer, and there have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist.
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raphy describes  as evidencing little  "elaboration  of philosophical
vision"7  and "never aspiring beyond plain, workmanlike  prose."8
Justice White's  controlling philosophy  (or lack thereof) is ex-
emplified  by  his  votes  in  three  cases  during  the  1986  October
Term.  The Supreme Court during that term handed down the so-
called  "Takings  Trilogy,"  three  cases  raising  Fifth  Amendment
regulatory takings challenges to  environmental restrictions:  Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 9 First  English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.  County of Los Angeles,10
and Nollan v. California  Coastal  Commission.1  The juxtaposition
of these three cases presented a true jurisprudential paradox and
certainly  no  readily  discernible,  coherent  view  of  the  Takings
Clause.12
Nor do White's opinions for the Court otherwise  suggest any
distinct vision of the role of law in environmental protection.  The
Official  Papers  of Justice  Thurgood  Marshall  provide  another
clear  example.  In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v.  Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,13 Justice White wrote for the Court's
slim  five-Justice  majority  an  opinion  that  upheld  the  United
States  Environmental  Protection  Agency's  (EPA) construction  of
the Clean Water Act.  As disclosed by the Marshall  Papers, how-
ever, he did so only after concluding that there is "little or no dif-
ference  in principle" between  the  opposing  arguments  and  that
"administrative law will not be measurably advanced  or set back
however this case is decided.' 4  White did not see the case, which-
ever way it was decided, as being of significant import.  The  case
presented  only  a  narrow,  fact-bound  issue  regarding  the  suffi-
ciency of an administrative  record.
7.  DENNIS  HUTCHINSON,  THE  MAN  WHO  ONCE  WAS  WIZZER  WHITE  451  (1998)
(quoting Kate Stith, Byron White: Last of the New Deal  Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19 n.1
(1993)).
8.  Id. at 454.
9.  480 U.S. 470 (1987).
10.  482 U.S.  304 (1987).
11.  483 U.S.  825 (1987).
12.  See Frank Michelman,  Takings, 1987, 88  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1600,  1625 (1988).
13.  470 U.S.  116  (1985).
14.  Letter from Justice Byron R. White to The Chief Justice, Re: 83- 1013-Chem-
ical Manufacturers  Ass'n v. NRDC (November 13,  1984) (Official Papers of the Cham-
bers of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
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B.  Justice Kennedy:  The Justice Most Often in the Majority  in
Environmental Cases
Another  revealing  factual  inquiry  concerns  the  frequency
with which  individual  Justices  were in  the majority in environ-
mental cases during the past thirty years.  Not surprisingly, Jus-
tice White's  percentage  for being in the majority is very high; he
voted with the majority 89.2% of the time.  His being in the major-
ity so often may also provide a neutral explanation for why White
authored  so many opinions  for the Court.  But opportunities  and
opinions  do not necessarily  go hand-in-hand.  Chief Justice War-
ren Burger, for instance, had an even higher percentage  for being
in the majority  and wrote far fewer  opinions.  The Chief Justice
was in the majority in over 91.5% of the 140 environmental  cases
in which he participated.  Yet he wrote only eight opinions for the
Court.
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in
the majority, however, does not relate to either Chief Justice Bur-
ger or to Justice White.  The Justice with the most astounding re-
cord for being in the majority  is Justice Kennedy.  Kennedy has
participated  in fifty-seven  cases  to  date.  Other than an original
action of interstate water dispute,15 he has dissented only once, in
Pennsylvania v.  Union Gas Co.16  The Court, moreover, has since
overruled its eleventh amendment decision in Union Gas.17  So, in
effect, Justice Kennedy's record is virtually 100% (putting aside a
couple of somewhat qualified concurring  opinions).' 8
But how  many opinions  for  the  Court has Justice  Kennedy
written?  One might expect as many as ten but certainly no fewer
than six.  But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy
had written only two opinions for the Court.19  He added two more
this past Term. 20  Kennedy supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth
vote in three out of those four cases.
15.  See Oklahoma  v. New Mexico, 501  U.S.  221 (1991).
16.  491 U.S.  1 (1989).
17.  See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.  44 (1996).
18.  During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in
Lujan v.  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),  which also joined Justice  Scalia's
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion  in Lucas v. South
Carolina  Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003  (1992), which joined only in the judgment.
19.  See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383  (1994); Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene  Tribe of Idaho,  521 U.S. 261  (1997).
20.  The third and fourth cases were both decided after the formal presentation  of
the Garrison Lecture this past March.  See City of Monterey v. Del Monte  Dunes, 119
S.  Ct.  1624  (1999);  Amoco  Production  Co.  v.  Southern  Ute  Tribe,  119  S.  Ct.  1719
(1999).
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This is a striking result.  The  most significant vote has little
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing.  Justice Kennedy
is the key to the majority in environmental protection and natural
resources law cases today.  Yet he almost never writes an opinion
for the Court on these issues.
The  upshot  is  the  exacerbation  of the Court's  longstanding
lack of environmental voice.  Justice White, who wrote most of the
opinions, did not provide it.  Justice Kennedy, who now appears to
reflect the controlling philosophy for the Court in these cases, has
similarly not yet  expressed  an  overarching  view of the  environ-
mental law field.  He has instead, like White during the 1970s and
1980s,  simply joined opinions that, because they are the products
of shifting  majority  coalitions,  lack  any  consistent  or  coherent
theme.
C.  Justice  Douglas vs. Justice Scalia:  Scoring the Justices  on
Environmental  Protection
The  last categorical  inquiry  concerns  the voting patterns  of
individual Justices based on the relationship of their votes to envi-
ronmental protection objectives.  When do their votes promote en-
vironmental  protection?  And  when  do  their  votes  appear  to
undercut it?
Most Court observers' intuitions regarding the Justices would
likely  be  that those  Justices  who  are  considered  "liberal"  cast
votes in favor of environmental  protection  concerns,  while  those
more  "conservative" members  of the  Court  do not.  To  test that
hypothesis,  I undertook two detailed analyses  of the votes of the
Justices-one more qualitative  and the other striving to be quan-
titative.  Interestingly,  the  more  qualitative  analysis  questions
the intuitive view, while the more quantitative  approach restores
some  of its force.  Each is discussed next.
1.  What is most immediately suggested by an admittedly un-
scientific, impressionistic review of the votes of individual Justices
in environmental cases is the wholly paradoxical nature of the vot-
ing patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protec-
tion perspective. 21  The votes of a few  Justices in selected  cases
are illustrative.
21.  My conclusions  in  this single respect are strikingly similar to those drawn by
Professor Sive, based on his review in  1994 of the Supreme Court's environmental law
rulings in the October  1993 Term.  Remarking upon the odd voting patterns  of indi-
vidual Justices  in  those  cases,  Professor Sive characterized  environmental cases  as
making for "strange judicial bedfellows" that Term.  See David Sive & Daniel  Riesel,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the
environmental  community  for  being  unsympathetic  to  environ-
mental protection concerns.  There are his votes  against more ex-
pansive federal reserved water rights in national forests in United
States v.  New Mexico;22 against enhanced procedural rights for en-
vironmentalists  in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.  ;23 against endangered  species
protection in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill; 24 and in favor of a
more  aggressive  regulatory  takings test in both Penn Central v.
City  of  New  York 25  and  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal Ass'n  v.
DeBenedictis.26
Labeling the Chief Justice  as somehow  "anti-environmental"
is problematic  because many of his votes support environmental-
ist causes.  He voted to uphold environmental criminal convictions
in  United States  v.  Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.; 27
supported  the validity  of stricter  local  noise  controls  in  City of
Burbank v.  Lockheed Air Terminal; 28  concluded  that federal  in-
stallations  must comply  with  state air pollution  control  require-
ments  in Hancock v.  Train29  and joined  the dissenters in Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society30  in contending that
the U.S. Secretary  of Commerce was required to certify Japan for
failing to comply with International Whaling Convention whaling
quotas.  Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in a
series  of Dormant Commerce  Clause cases stress the importance
of the environmental protection goals as an affirmative reason for
upholding the challenged  governmental  action.31
Similar  crisscrossing  tendencies  are  evident in  the  votes  of
Justice Stevens, who is generally considered  sympathetic  to envi-
ronmental  protection  concerns.  Stevens'  opinions,  widely  hailed
An Analysis of the Justices'  Positions  in Environmental Cases Demonstrates that Doc-
trinal Classifications  Aren't Very  Useful, NAT'L L.J.,  October  3,  1994, at B5.
22.  438  U.S. 696 (1978).
23.  435  U.S.  519 (1978).
24.  437  U.S.  153, 211  (1978)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25.  438  U.S.  104,  138  (1978)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26.  480 U.S. 470, 506  (1987)  (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27.  411  U.S. 655,  676  (1973)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28.  411  U.S. 624, 640  (1973)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29.  426 U.S.  167,  199  (1976) (Rehnquist,  J., dissenting).
30.  478  U.S. 221,  241  (1986)  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31.  See Philadelphia v.  New Jersey, 437 U.S.  617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting);  Chemical Waste Management  v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J.,  dissenting),  Oregon  Waste Systems  v. Oregon,  511 U.S.  93,  108 (1992)  (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
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by  the  environmental  community,  include  his  opinion  for  the
Court  in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n,3 2  and his  dissents  in
Nollan v.  California  Coastal Commission,33 Lucas v.  South Caro-
lina Coastal Council,34  Weinberger v.  Romero Barcelo, 35 and Sec-
retary of the Interior  v.  California. 36
But environmentalists  do not similarly acclaim  Stevens' dis-
sents  in California Coastal Comm'n v.  Granite Rock,37  favoring
preemption of state environmental regulation of mining activities
on federal land; in Penn Central,  against the constitutionality of a
state  historic  landmark  designation  challenged  as  a regulatory
taking;38  and in Environmental Defense Fund v.  City of Chicago, 39
rejecting the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that an exemp-
tion from  a federal  hazardous  waste statute  should  be narrowly
read.  Several  of Stevens' votes against positions favored  by envi-
ronmentalists  supplied the critical fifth vote for the majority's ad-
verse  ruling, including  United States v.  New Mexico,40 Industrial
Union v.  American Petroleum, 41 and Japan Whaling Ass'n.42
For  almost  all  of the Justices,  a  similar pattern  is  evident.
Whatever the particular Justice's reputation, significant counter-
examples are available.  Whether it is Justice Brennan, authoring
the  environmentalist's  nightmare of a  dissent in San Diego Gas
Electric v.  City of San Diego,43  which  subsequently  became  the
Court's holding in First English Evangelical Church v.  County of
Los Angeles,44 or Justice  O'Connor, dissenting in First English,45
and  in  Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n  v.  Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,46 in which  she supported NRDC's  more envi-
32.  480 U.S. 470 (1987).
33.  483 U.S. 825,  866 (1987)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34.  505 U.S.  1003,  1061  (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35.  456 U.S. 305,  322 (1982)  (Stevens, J.,  dissenting).
36.  464 U.S. 312,  344 (1984)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37.  480 U.S. 572,  594 (1987)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38.  438 U.S.  104,  138  (1978) (Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
39.  511  U.S. 328,  340 (1994) (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).
40.  438 U.S. 696 (1978).
41.  448 U.S. 607 (1980).
42.  478 U.S. 221 (1986).
43.  450 U.S. 621,  636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44.  482  U.S. 304 (1987).
45.  See  id. at  322  (O'Connor,  J., joining  in  part,  Stevens  &  Blackmun,  JJ.,
dissenting).
46.  470  U.S. 116,  165  (1985).
627
9PACE ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW REVIEW
ronmentally  protective  reading  of the  Clean  Water  Act,  while
Justice Brennan did not.47
2.  A more  quantitative  approach to the Justices' voting sug-
gests,  however,  some  discernible  patterns  and tendencies  in the
votes  of the  Justices  in  environmental  cases.  These  tendencies
may or may not be sufficiently strong to suggest a correlation be-
tween the votes  and overarching labels  such as "conservative" or
"liberal."  But, in either event, they strongly suggest that, at least
for some justices, the environmental  dimension of the case is rele-
vant to how the Justice casts his or her vote in that case.
The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring system
somewhat reminiscent of that employed by the League of Conser-
vation  Voters  Test in  scoring  members  of Congress  on  environ-
mental matters.48  Here, however, it is  applied to the Justices.  A
Justice  is awarded  one  point for  each  pro-environmental  protec-
tion outcome for which the Justice voted.  The final score, referred
to as an "EP score," is based on the percentage of pro-environmen-
tal votes the Justice cast, out of those cases in which that Justice
participated.  For the purposes of calculating this score, the entire
database of 243 cases is not used.  The scores are instead based on
a subset of approximately 100 cases, representing those cases that
are more susceptible to being assigned a pro-environmental  posi-
tion.49  An EP score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the envi-
ronmentally-protective  outcome  in  all  the  cases  in  which  she
participated.  A score of zero means that the Justice voted for that
environmental outcome  in none of the cases.
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmen-
tally-protective,  the  scores  are  both  easy  and  not  surprising  in
their  results.50  The highest  score went to Justice  Douglas, who
47.  Justice  Brennan  joined  Justice  White's  majority  opinion,  supplying  the
needed  fifth vote for EPA and against NRDC.  See id. at 116.
48.  See League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters National
Environmental Scorecard at http://www.lcv.org/scorecards/index.htm  (last  visited
May  28,  1999).
49.  The cases upon which the EP Scores are based are those listed in italics in the
appendix.
50.  The EP scores for the nineteen Justices  who have  served on the  Court since
October  Term  1969  are Chief Justice Burger  (34.3),  Justices  Black  (75),  Blackmun
(50.3),  Brennan (58.5),  Breyer (66.6),  Douglas (100),  Ginsburg (63.6),  Harlan  (33.3),
Kennedy (25.9), Marshall (61.3), O'Connor (30.4), Powell (30), Chief Justice Rehnquist
(36.5),  Scalia (13.8),  Souter  (57.1),  Stevens (50.6),  Stewart  (42.6),  Thomas  (20), and
White (36.3).  For a full description  of the database upon which the EP analysis was
performed, see Richard J.  Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"About  Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court, 47  U.C.L.A.  L.  REV.  703  (2000).
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scored  100.  Justice Douglas may well  be the only environmental
Justice  ever  on  the  Court,  at least  in  modem  times.  Notwith-
standing his high profile, Justice Douglas was, as a practical mat-
ter, barely there  for modem  environmental  law.  He was  off the
Court by 1975, and plagued by serious health problems during his
final time on the Court.  As a result, he voted in only fifteen  of the
100  cases  surveyed for the EP Score.
The highest EP scores for those Justices serving on the Court
for substantial time are those of Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall
(61.3) and Stevens (50.6).51  Each of their scores, however, is much
lower  than Douglas'  score.  None  of these  other  scores  is  suffi-
ciently high to  suggest that the environmental  protection  dimen-
sion of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing
their respective votes.
The EP scoring analysis further identifies more Justices with
potentially revealing  EP scores  on  the low  end, suggesting  some
possible  skepticism,  or perhaps  even  hostility,  towards  environ-
mental protection concerns  or the kind of legal  regime such  con-
cerns  promote.  There are many  EP scores  below  thirty-three,  a
number below thirty, and two below twenty-five.  As with the high
EP scores,  there is a hands-down winner, though no score  of zero
to equal Justice Douglas' score of 100.  And, as with Justice Doug-
las, there are  no surprises  at the lowest of the low end.
The low score  goes to Justice  Scalia with  a score just below
fourteen, which is strikingly low.  It  is a score so low that one can
fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives environmental protection
concerns  as  promoting  a  set  of legal  rules  antithetical  to  that
which he favors.  Indeed, the kind of legal system promoted by en-
vironmental  law  seems  to  be  of sufficient  concern  that  it  even
prompts Justice  Scalia  sometimes to  abandon  his views  on  core
matters involving constitutional and statutory interpretation.
5 2
51.  Although the cases upon which the EP scores are based appear in the appen-
dix, infra, the full related database,  including the voting breakdown in each of those
cases, the  case topic, the identity of the legal  position in  each case  that received  a
point, and the final EP scores of each of the Justices, is not separately published here
because of its substantial length.  It instead appears in Richard J.  Lazarus, Restoring
What's "Environmental"About  Environmental  Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A.
L. REV.  703 (2000).
52.  Justice  Scalia's  opinion  for  the  Court  in Lucas  v.  South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992), embracing an interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment based on "our constitutional culture," and his dissenting opinion in Public Util-
ity District No.  1 v.  Washington Department of Ecology,  511  U.S.  700,  724  (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), reaching for a construction of the Clean Water Act  favored by
industry, are illustrative. See 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While I agree
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What  about Kennedy, the Court's current bellwether Justice
who  has been  in the  majority  in  virtually  every  environmental
case before the Court since he joined the bench?  His  score is just
below  twenty-six,  which  is the third lowest out of nineteen Jus-
tices over the past thirty years.  Although Justice Kennedy's score
may well mask  some  significant  potential  for  a future  shift,
5 3  it
should be unsettling for environmentalists  to learn that a score of
twenty-six represents the Court's  current point of equilibrium.
3.  Finally, viewed over time, the EP scores of the Justices in-
dicate that the Court as a whole is steadily becoming less respon-
sive to environmental  protection.  Indeed, the overall shift in the
fate of environmental  protection before the Court during the past
three decades  is telling.54  In 1975, there were no Justices sitting
on the Court with scores below thirty.  Today, there are three with
scores of thirty or below (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) and two
with scores  of twenty  or below (Scalia and Thomas).55
II.  The  Supreme  Court's Apathy and Possible Antipathy
Towards  Environmental  Protection:  Lessons for the
Current and Future Environmental  Lawyer
The overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking
to the Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environ-
mental protection.  Environmental  protection concerns implicated
fully with the thorough analysis  in the Court's opinion,  I add  this comment  for em-
phasis.  For judges who find it  unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern
the intent  of Congress, this is (or should  be) an easy case.").
53.  Although Justice Kennedy's writing  in the area remains sparse, he  filed con-
curring opinions  in  three  cases  in  which he expressed views that create at least the
theoretical possibility of his breaking away from Justice Scalia's approach.  See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J.,  concurring); Lujan
v.  Defenders  of Wildlife, 504  U.S.  at  579 (Kennedy,  J., concurring);  Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel,  118  S.  Ct. 2131,  2154 (1998)  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring).  See Richard
Lazarus,  Balance  May Shift Against Scalia, ENVr'L  FORUM  8 (May/June  1999).
54.  These  comparisons  are based  on  the Justices'  EP scores for  their entire  ca-
reers and not their EP scores as of the precise date to which the text refers.  A refer-
ence to the EP scores of the Justices in  1975,  therefore, considers the career EP scores
of all the  Justices who were  serving  on the Court  in  1975,  which will include  their
votes  before  and after  1975.  The  1975  date simply  determines  the  identity  of the
relevant Justices and does not confine the database with regard to precedent for pur-
poses  of calculating  EP scores.
55.  One must be careful, however, about too quickly equating the votes of individ-
ual Justices with Court rulings.  The  two do not necessarily  correlate.  For instance,
forty  environmentally  favorable  votes  could  reflect  five  unanimous  rulings  or nine
five/four rulings.  For that same reason, thirty environmentally favorable votes could
reflect  six  favorable  Court rulings  and, therefore,  more than  forty  environmentally
favorable  votes.
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by a case  appear, at best, to  play no favored role in shaping the
outcome.  But nor does the outcome  seem wholly neutral or indif-
ferent to the presence  of those concerns.
Over the  past three  decades,  environmental  protection  con-
cerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influenc-
ing the Court's outcome.  The preferred  outcome is one that places
less,  rather than more,  weight  on the  need  to promote  environ-
mental protection.  The Court's decisions, and the attitudes of the
individual Justices, reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy of
environmental  protection  goals  and  the  various  laws  that seek
their promotion.  This analysis leads to two significant conclusions
worth further analysis.
The first conclusion relates to the relative absence  of any no-
tion, for most of the Justices during the past three decades,  that
environmental  law is a distinct area of law,  as opposed  to just a
collection  of legal issues incidentally  arising in a factual  setting
where  environmental  protection  concerns  are  what  is  at  stake.
The Court's opinions lack any distinct environmental voice.  Miss-
ing is any emphasis on the nature  or character of environmental
protection  concerns  and  their import for judicial construction  of
relevant legal rules.  The Court's decisions in TVA  v. Hill,56  City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 57  and Babbitt v.  Sweet
Home Chapter  of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
5 8 all represent
significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental  concerns in the
Supreme  Court.  In none of those rulings, however,  do those con-
cerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in the Court's  analysis.
Imagine,  however, if Justice  Douglas were  on the Court and
writing  any  of the  Court's  opinions  in  those  three  cases.  The
Court's  rhetoric regarding environmental  protection  and its legal
relevance  would  be  far different.  Recall  his genuine  passion  in
dissenting  in Sierra Club v.  Morton,59  in favor of expansive  no-
tions  of legal standing on behalf of "inarticulate members  of the
ecological  group" (e.g. animals) where  he argued  in favor of legal
doctrine providing  a voice in court "all of the forms of life ...  the
pileated woodpecker  as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings
as well as the trout in the streams."60  Or consider Justice Black's
emotional  dissent  in San Antonio Conservation Society  v.  Texas
56.  437  U.S. 153  (1978).
57.  511 U.S. 328 (1994).
58.  515 U.S. 687 (1995).
59.  405  U.S. 727,  741  (1972)  (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60.  Id. at 752.
13PACE ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW REVIEW
Highway Commission, 61 in which he decried cars "spew[ing]  forth
air and noise pollution,"62 he warned  of mothers "grow[ing]  anx-
ious...  lest their children be crushed beneath the massive wheels
of interstate  trucks,"63  and he  described  environmental  laws  as
safeguarding  "our Nation's  well-being and our very  survival."64
Such  emotion  has  meaning  when  it  comes  from  the  Supreme
Court.
For most  of the  Court, most  of the time, environmental  law
has become no more than a subspecies of administrative law, rais-
ing no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a
substantive  area  of law.  Environmental  protection  is merely  an
incidental context for resolution of a legal question.  Recall  again
Justice White's  decision to side  with EPA in Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n  v.  NRDC,65  upholding  the  validity  of variances  for
technology-based  standards  otherwise applicable to  discharges  of
toxic  effluent.  He  stressed  in his note  to Justice  Marshall that
resolution of the case did not make much of a difference to admin-
istrative law one way or the other.66
What are the practical implications of the Court's approach to
environmental  law  for  someone wanting  to be  an environmental
lawyer,  or  a lawyer  concerned  about  environmental  protection?
First, to  be  an  outstanding  environmental  lawyer requires  your
being an  excellent  lawyer.  That  means  a law  student zealously
pursuing  a career  in environmental  law  should not just concen-
trate on taking "environmental law" classes.  Master the "wilder-
ness"  of  administrative  law.67  Delve  into  the  complexities  of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction-likely  the most important
course many environmental  public interest litigators take in law
school.  Similarly,  approach  courses  in corporations,  tax,  securi-
ties, and real estate law.  More often than not, the fate of the envi-
ronmental  interests  will  turn  on  the  resolution  of legal  issues
rooted deeply in these other areas  of law.
Likewise,  as  legal  counsel,  do not approach  cases with envi-
ronmental  blinders on.  Be ready to see and understand  the case
or  controversy  in  its  broader  legal  context.  And  be  ready  to
61.  400 U.S.  968 (1971)  (Black, J., dissenting).
62.  Id.  at 969.
63.  Id.
64.  Id.  at 971.
65.  470 U.S.  116 (1985).
66.  See supra note  14, and accompanying  text.
67.  See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental  Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM.  L. REV.  612 (1970).
632 [Vol.  19
14 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/72002]  THIRTY  YEARS  OF ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW
master that broader legal context.  Do not just read environmental
cases.  An environmental lawyer is likely to find the most impor-
tant, most  relevant  precedent  elsewhere,  precisely  because  it  is
elsewhere.
68
Indeed, because of environmental protection's apparent disfa-
vored status,  the  precedent  most  supportive  of an  environmen-
tally-protective  outcome  frequently can  be found in  cases where
the favorable  implications  for environmental  protection  concerns
are not at all immediately  obvious.  The  challenge of the environ-
mental lawyer is to discover and exploit (and, when necessary, dis-
tinguish)  that  potentially  relevant  precedent.  It  may  be  in
nonenvironmental standing cases such as the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision  in Federal Election Commission v.  Akins,69  which
supports broadened standing in environmental  cases involving in-
formation reporting requirements;70  or nonenvironmental  regula-
tory takings cases such as Eastern  Enterprises  v. Apfel,71 in which
Justice  Kennedy  advances  a more restricted  approach  to regula-
tory  takings  doctrine  that  could  aid  environmental  regulators
faced with such constitutional  challenges.72
The second closely related lesson  for the environmental  law-
yer is the importance  of being strategic in framing and presenting
environmental cases in litigation.  An environmental  lawyer, espe-
cially one representing interests  that support enhanced  environ-
mental  protection  measures,  should  not mistake  her motivation
and interest in the case for what is likely to prompt a favorable
outcome in an administrative or judicial setting.  The environmen-
tal lawyer must be open to the possibility that it may not be in her
client's strategic interest to emphasize the environmental  protec-
tion dimensions  of the case at all.
68.  For example,  the Supreme  Court's ruling this past Term in Saenz v.  Roe,  119
S. Ct. 1518 (1999),  resurrecting the Fourteenth Amendment's  Privilege and Immuni-
ties  Clause  to strike  down California's  cap on welfare  payments  for new  residents,
may well trigger a  new wave of constitutional challenges  brought by property owners
against  environmental  regulators  based on that same Clause.  See Carrie Johnson,
The Road to Saenz v.  Roe, 22  THE  LEGAL TiMEs  1,  May  24,  1999;  Clint Bolick, Back
from the Grave-The Supreme Court Exhumes the  14th Amendment's 'Privileges  or
Immunities' Clause, 22 THE  LEGAL  TIMES  19, May  17, 1999.
69.  524 U.S.  11 (1998).
70.  See Cass  Sunstein, Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Be-
yond, 147  U. PA.  L. REV.  613-15,  621-24,  651-52, 663-69  (1999)
71.  524 U.S. 498, 539-47  (1998).
72.  See 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)  (Kennedy, J., concurring in  part and dissenting
in  part); Richard Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L FORUM  8 (May/
June 1999).
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An  advocate  needs,  of course,  to focus the  decisionmaker  on
her best legal or policy arguments.  Those that the advocate cares
about,  however,  may  not  be  those  likely  to  motivate  the  deci-
sionmaker towards the preferred  outcome.  Like any good lawyer,
the environmental  lawyer needs to identify and address the deci-
sionmaker's concerns, and not make the mistake of assuming that
she shares the advocate's  own.
The current Court is, at the very least, not a Court comprised
of Justices looking at cases  as "environmental  law" cases.  Other
crosscutting issues are more likely to influence their votes rather
than the environmental  protection implications of one result over
another.  What  the Justices  believe,  for instance,  should be  the
relationship  between courts  and  administrative  agencies  regard-
ing matters of statutory construction, or, the relationship between
states and the federal government in their respective areas of law-
making.  The Justices strive for consistency  on these crosscutting
issues that apply in a variety of contexts,  of which environmental
law seems to be just one  of many.
Different  cases  therefore  require  different  strategies.  For
Justice Scalia, it may well be to turn the case into a plain meaning
case,  or a nonlegislative  history  case.73  Indeed,  for Scalia,  there
may well be  reason not to emphasize  the positive  environmental
protection implications of the side that you are promoting.  For the
Chief Justice, it  may well be to emphasize judicial  integrity con-
cerns,  including  the  autonomy  of trial courts,  the  costs  of frag-
mented  litigation,  premature  judicial  decision  making,  and
possible burdens on the federal judiciary.74  For Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor,  it may well be the federalism  implications of a par-
ticular outcome, stare decisis, concerns with judicial activism, and
the sheer inequities  of a particular result.
73.  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994);
Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v.  Environmental  Defense
Fund: Searching  for Plain  Meaning in Unambiguous  Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 15-19  (1995).
74.  The  Chief Justice's  concerns  with  preserving  state  sovereignty  in  the  Dor-
mant Commerce  Clause cases is one obvious  example. See notes 23 to 32, supra, and
accompanying text.  Similar concerns seem to temper Rehnquist's views  on the regu-
latory takings issue.  See Richard J.  Lazarus,  Counting Votes and Discounting Hold-
ings in the Supreme Court's  Regulatory Takings Cases, 38 WM.  & MARY  L. REV.  1099,
1111-14 (1996); Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Re: Agins v.  City of Tiburon (May  29,  1980)  (Official  Papers of the Chambers  of
Justice  Thurgood  Marshall)  ("I am  somewhat  uneasy about the latitude which  your
treatment of federal constitutional review of local zoning ordinances on pages 5  and 6
of your present draft appears  to give federal  courts.").  Id.
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The  more  fundamental  issue  is  whether,  regardless  of the
strategic advantages  of thinking outside the "environmental" box
in environmental litigation, such a stripping of the "environment"
out of environmental law is a positive or appropriate  development
for environmental  law.  My short  answer  is  the  law  professor's
classic "yes and no."  Some stripping is appropriate, but not to the
extent that has occurred  in the Supreme  Court.
Why is it partially appropriate?  Simply because the Justices'
natural instinct about environmental  law is partially correct:  En-
vironmental  law does not exist in a vacuum.  Environmental  law
issues  do  arise  in contexts  that implicate  other, very important
crosscutting  areas  of law,  such as  administrative  law, corporate
law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth Amendment law, and criminal
law.
Nor  is  it  happenstance  that environmental  law  constantly
arises in these other contexts.  So many different kinds of activi-
ties implicate environmental protection concerns that the legal re-
quirements  serving  that  end  must  necessarily  be  widely
applicable.  Those legal requirements  also necessarily  create fric-
tion  by restriking  balances  previously  reached  by  other  pre-ex-
isting  legal  rules  governing  that  same  activity.  By  promoting
rapid  change in the law in response to increased public  demands
for  environmental  protection,  environmental  law  necessarily
places  great  pressure  on  lawmaking  institutions  and  generates
conflicts  between  competing  lawmaking fora,  between  sovereign
authorities  (local, state, tribal and  federal)  and within  their re-
spective  executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
The Justices' focus in the first instance on these crosscutting
issues is also quite proper.  The Justices  should strive  for consis-
tency in their resolution.  There should not always be one answer
if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not.
Such singularly outcome-dependent  judicial reasoning could seri-
ously undermine the law's essential integrity and legitimacy.
But that is not to say that environmental protection concerns
are  irrelevant when  addressing  those  crosscutting issues.  Such
concerns legitimately inform the judicial resolution of those issues
and sometimes justify striking a new and different balance.  Envi-
ronmental  protection  concerns  need  not always  be  a  dispositive
factor to be legitimately  so  in some instances,  and always  to re-
main a relevant factor  for separate consideration.
In  the  early  1970s,  the  Court  appeared  to understand  the
broader implications of the nation's commitment to a legal regime
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for  environmental  protection.  The Court seemed  to recognize  its
responsibility to account for the corresponding evolutionary  pres-
sures being triggered  by that emerging legal regime on  other in-
tersecting  areas  of law  and  on  lawmaking  institutions.  Since
then, the Court has too  often mistakenly equated  the judiciary's
involvement with such traditional, legitimate legal evolution with
the 1980s judicial bugaboo of "judicial activism."
The cost of this mistaken belief is substantial.  The Court de-
prives itself of its ability to consider the sheer importance of envi-
ronmental  protection  to the issues  before the  Court.  Even  more
fundamentally,  the  Court fails  to  consider how  the special  chal-
lenges  that  environmental  protection  presents  may  warrant
evolution in legal doctrine. 75
The Court's treatment of the issue of standing during the past
three decades is emblematic of its attitude towards environmental
law.  The  Court  originally  relaxed  standing  requirements  in re-
sponse  to  the  special  challenges  presented  by  environmental
law.7 6  The Court revised  the standing doctrine  in recognition  of
the nature of the injuries at stake in environmental  litigation be-
ing neither clearly  economic  nor physical.7 7  The Court  likewise
took  special  account of the inevitable,  uncertain  and speculative
nature of such injuries, in particular, the more attenuated chain of
causation between  action and injury. 78
In recent years the Court has handed down a series of stand-
ing rulings that fails to consider these challenges and, as a result,
makes  it especially  difficult for plaintiff citizens to maintain envi-
75.  To be sure, one can perceive snippets of environmental law's influence in rare,
isolated opinions  of the Justices.  Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas was  most apt to
see the relationship.  For instance,  in  two cases  in  1972,  Salyer Land Co. v.  Tulare
Lake Basin Water, 410 U.S.  719 (1972)  and Associated Enterprises,  Inc. v.  Toltec Wa-
tershed Improvement, 410 U.S. 743 (1972),  the Court ruled that equal protection was
not violated by  a state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only landowners
to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their votes according
to the value of the land each owned.  Justice Douglas perceived the cases differently
than the majority precisely because  he understood the role that water played in  the
lives and ecosystem of the affected tenants.  See 410 U.S. at 749 ("It is also inconceiv-
able that a body with the power  to destroy  a river by damming it  and so deprive  a
watershed  of one  of its most salient environmental  assets  does not  have 'sufficient
impact' on the interests of people  generally  to invoke the principles  of  [this Court's
voting rights precedent]").  Id.
76.  See Richard J. Lazarus,  Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural  Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L.  REV.  631,
658-64 (1986).
77.  See Sierra Club  v. Morton,  405 U.S.  727, 738 (1972).
78.  See United States v.  S.C.R.A.P.,  412  U.S. 669, 685 (1973).
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ronmental  lawsuits.  The  trend  has  been  so  plain  that  it  even
prompted Justice Blackmun to question openly in dissent why the
Court  systematically  disfavored  environmental  plaintiffs  in  the
law  of standing.
79
Another area  is the law of regulatory takings.  Here too, the
Court's early case law suggested an appreciation for how environ-
mental  protection  and  natural  resource  conservation  concerns
might justify a rethinking of the nature of private property rights
in natural resources.80  But, the Court has since seemed more at-
tracted to a view of property that is static, not dynamic, and there-
fore restricts the legislature's  constitutional authority to promote
environmental  protection.8'
Standing law and regulatory  takings law  are just two of the
more obvious examples.  The Court's need to consider the lessons
supplied  by environmental  law in addressing crosscutting issues
extends to less obvious areas as well, such as corporate  law.  Dur-
ing  the  October  1997  Term,  for  instance,  in  United States  v.
Bestfoods, 2 the  Court faced  the question  under the Comprehen-
sive  Environmental  Response,  Compensation,  and  Liability Act
(CERCLA),83  of the liability of a parent corporation for the actions
of  a  subsidiary.  What  was  striking  about  the  oral  argument
before the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and
sympathetic  to the important policy objectives  underlying corpo-
rate law's limited liability rules, but were not  similarly aware  of
environmental law's competing concerns.  Indeed, members  of the
Court  appeared  shocked  to  learn  from  both government  and  in-
dustry  counsel,  the  undisputed  common  ground  regarding  con-
gressional intent in CERCLA in terms of corporate liability.8 4
79.  See Lujan v. Defenders  of Wildlife,  504 U.S.  555,  606  (1992)  (Blackmun,  J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.")  Id.  After the presentation of this Gar-
rison Lecture  and immediately  before this article  went to  final press,  the Supreme
Court took an anticipated, yet important, step toward reversing this trend in a ruling
noted later in this  article.  See infra, note  108.
80.  See, e.g.,  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Penn Central
v.  City of New York, 438  U.S. 104  (1978);  Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.  51 (1980).
81.  See First English Evangelical  Lutheran Church  of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles,  482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.  1003 (1992);  Dolan v.  City
of Tigard, 512 U.S.  374 (1994).
82.  524 U.S. 51  (1998).
83.  42 U.S.C.  §§  9601 et seq. (1999).
84.  Official Transcript of the Oral Argument before  the United States Supreme
Court,  United States u. Bestfoods, No.  97-454, pp.  16-17,  1998 U.S. Trans. LEXIS  61
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III.  Bringing the "Environment" Back to Environmental
Law: Friends  of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services
The important remaining question is whether existing trends
in  the  Court's  approach  to  environmental  law  can  be  changed.
Past experience  strongly  suggests that the answer to  that ques-
tion  may  well  depend  on  both  the life  experiences  (professional
and  personal)  that  the  current  and  future  Justices  bring  with
them to their work.  It  is no coincidence that the only Justice with
a  significantly  high  EP  Score  (100)  is  Justice  Douglas,  whose
deeply-held  views  favoring  environmental  protection  restrictions
find their roots in his life-long involvement with the natural envi-
ronment as an avid hiker and outdoorsman.85  No current Justice
has comparable  links to the natural environment in general or to
either resource conservation or environmental  protection matters
more particularly.
8 6
Perhaps the short answer  to the question  of how best to re-
store the "environment" to environmental  law in the Court might
be to find some way to provide individual  Justices  with personal
experiences  that allow them to appreciate more fully the environ-
mental  stakes  of the  cases  before  the  Court.  But putting  aside
such extra-judicial  influences,  the most viable basis for persuad-
ing the Justices of the need for placing greater weight on the envi-
ronmental dimension of environmental  law is going to be through
the facts of the individual cases brought to the Court's  attention.
Each  of those  cases presents  the Justices with a  story about the
way in which laws affect the quality of life.  The cumulative  effect
of multiple stories can significantly affect the way the Justices de-
cide what  cases  to hear and  how then to  decide the legal issues
presented.
To  the detriment  of environmental  protection  concerns,  the
property rights movement has used this technique with enormous
success.  By bringing to the Court's attention during the past sev-
eral decades a series of cases, the factual allegations  of which ap-
pear  to  support  their  claim  of  environmental  regulatory  over-
(March 24, 1998) (argument of Ms. Schiffer, counsel for the United States EPA); id. at
26-27 (argument of Mr. Geller, counsel for Bestfoods).
85.  See  WILLIAM  0.  DOUGLAS,  Go  EAST,  YOUNG  MAN,  203-36  (Delta Pub.  1974).
86.  The only current Justice with such possible strong personal ties to the natural
environment might be Justice David Souter, based on his reputation  as a hiker.  See
David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice:  Ascetic at Home But Vigorous on Bench, N.Y.
TIMES,  July 25,  1990,  at A1:3.
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reaching,  such as  claims  of economic  wipe-outs,8 7  or wheelchair-
bound,  blind  widows  being  denied  the  right  to  build  a  dream
home,88  these advocates have successfully fostered  a general judi-
cial skepticism about the reasonableness  of environmental  laws.
It  is,  of course,  that same judicial  skepticism  that environ-
mentalists  and  environmental  regulators  must  now  overcome.
Environmentalists  and  environmental  regulators  face  a  conun-
drum.  As previously described, it is likely often not in their short
term  strategic interests  to emphasize  the environmental  dimen-
sion of a case because of the Court's current skepticism.  But, un-
less environmentalists begin to tell their own story to the Justices,
they are unlikely to dispel that skepticism in the longer term.  A
simultaneous accomplishment  of those two often conflicting objec-
tives  will  not be  easy.  It  will require  careful  case  management
and  case  selection  to  bring to  the Justices'  attention  cases  that
both instruct the Court on the important policies and values safe-
guarded by environmental  protection laws  and explain how  such
safeguarding  is  entirely  consistent  with  our  nation's  legal
traditions.
There  is currently at least some reason for optimism that the
Court may be about to take an initial step in  the right direction.
The Court has agreed  to review this October 1999  Term a poten-
tially very important environmental  case, Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services. 8 9  The  Fourth  Circuit's  ruling
under review  in Laidlaw 90  was  an absolutely disastrous decision
for environmentalists.  But what made  the lower court ruling  so
significant was that it was not so much the product of a mere aber-
rational court of appeals decision than it  was suggestive of the ju-
risprudential  signals  that the Supreme  Court  has  been  sending
out to the lower courts  about the strict  application  of Article  III
case  or controversy requirements  to environmental  citizen  suits.
For that same reason, however, the case provided the Court with
the opportunity  both  to embrace  the important role Congress  in-
tended for citizen suits to serve in environmental law and to strike
a balance in constitutional Article III doctrine that is more accom-
modating to that congressional scheme.
87.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,  505 U.S. 1003,  1009  (1992).
88.  Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725  (1997); see Richard
J.  Lazarus,  Litigating Suitum  v.  Tahoe  Regional  Planning  Agency  in  the  United
States Supreme Court, 12 J.  LAND  USE  &  ENVTL.  L. 179,  184-86  (1997).
89.  525  U.S.  1176 (1999).
90.  Friends of the Earth v.  Laidlaw Environmental  Services,  149  F.3d 303  (4th
Cir. 1998).
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In Laidlaw, the  plaintiff,  Friends  of the  Earth, brought  a
fairly routine  citizen suit against an industrial facility owned  by
Laidlaw Environmental  Services based on  hundreds of violations
of Laidlaw's Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System  permit, both by exceeding allowable  mercury  dis-
charges  and  by  violating  monitoring  and  reporting  require-
ments.91  No  Gwaltney92  threshold  jurisdictional  problem  was
presented; no one disputed that the facility was in noncompliance
both at the time the sixty day-notice and the subsequent lawsuit
was filed.  The trial took several years, however, and by the time
the trial was  complete, the company was no longer in noncompli-
ance.  The district court, accordingly, declined  any request for in-
junctive relief, but imposed more than $400,000 in civil penalties,
payable to the U.S. Treasury, and expressly indicated that an at-
torney's fee award would similarly be forthcoming.93
On appeal,  however, the Fourth Circuit reversed.94  The ap-
pellate court held that once the facility came into compliance, the
case became  moot.95  No Article III jurisdiction existed, the court
ruled,  for either  a  civil  penalties  award  or for an  attorney's  fee
award.96  The court, accordingly, ordered dismissal of the action in
its entirety, an absolutely dramatic result.  Consider the perverse
incentive  the appellate court's reasoning provides  a regulated fa-
cility.  So long as the facility  comes into compliance  prior to final
judgment in a citizen suit enforcement  action, a facility that has
long  been  in  violation  of the  federal  environmental  law,  both
before  and after the filing of the complaint, cannot  be  subject to
either a civil penalty or an attorney's fee award.  The incentive  to
comply  prior  to  suit  is  dramatically  reduced.  Also  sharply  re-
duced, if not wholly eliminated, is the longstanding incentive that
defendants in environmental citizen suits have historically had to
settle their cases.  Such settlements  have led to defendants'  pay-
91.  See Friends  of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 956  F. Supp. 588,  600-01,  610  (D.  S.C.
1997).
92.  In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.  Chesapeake Bay Foundation,  484 U.S. 49
(1987), the Court held that Clean Water Act citizen suits could not be maintained for
wholly past violations of that Act.  See id.  at 56-63.  A plaintiff need, at a minimum,
set forth in the complaint good faith allegations  of violations ongoing at the time that
the complaint is filed. See id. at 64-65.
93.  See 956 F. Supp. at 610-11.
94.  See  149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir.  1998).
95.  See id.  at 307.
96.  See id.  at 306-07.  The court's attorney's  fee decision was especially remarka-
ble given that the court  accompanied  its ruling with a "but see" cite to the Supreme
Court's  decision in Gwaltney.  See id. at 307.
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ing  hundreds  of millions  of dollars  to  support  environmentally
beneficial projects.
97
From a purely historical perspective, the Court's granting cer-
tiorari in Friends of the Earth was, standing alone, of surprising
significance.  The  Court  has  heard  almost  250  environmental
cases on the merits during the past thirty years, yet this was only
the second time that the Court granted a citizen suit petition in an
environmental  case at the sole request of the citizen plaintiffs.  To
be sure, the Justices have frequently  done so at the behest of in-
dustry.98  Likewise, they have often granted review at the request
of federal, state and local governments. 99  But it has been twenty-
seven years  since the Court last granted review  at the exclusive
request of environmental plaintiffs, and that was in Sierra  Club v.
Morton 00  in  1972.
There  is also  good  reason  to believe  that the Court  granted
review in Friends  of the Earth  to rule in favor of the environmen-
tal plaintiffs.  It takes four votes to grant review and it  is unlikely
that the four votes this time came from Justices seeking to affirm
the Fourth Circuit's analysis.  A Justice seeking to make it harder
for  environmental  plaintiffs  to  bring  suits  would  not  pick  this
case.  This is a  case presenting  a record  in which the trial court
97.  See  Jeff Ganguly,  Comment,  Environmental Remediation Through Supple-
mental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed  Community In-
volvement in Federal Enforcement, 26  B.C.  ENVTL.  AFF.  L.  REV.  189  (1998);  Laurie
Droughton, Comment, Supplemental Environmental  Projects:  A Bargain  for the Envi-
ronment, 12  PACE  ENVTL.  L. REV.  789 (1995).
98.  Two recent examples  include The Steel  Co. v.  Citizens for A Better Environ-
ment, 523  U.S.  83  (1998),  and Bennett v. Spear, 520  U.S.  154 (1997), but there  are
many during the past three decades.  See, e.g.,  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983);
Chevron v.  NRDC, 467  U.S. 837 (1984);  Stringfellow  v. Concerned  Neighbors in Ac-
tion, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake  Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49  (1988).
99.  See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); California v. Sierra Club,
451  U.S.  287  (1981);  Watt  v.  Energy  Action  Education  Foundation,  454  U.S.  151
(1982);  Weinberger  v.  Catholic Action  of Hawaii/Peace  Education  Project,  454 U.S.
139  (1982); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711  (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989);  Lujan
v. Defenders  of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100.  Sierra  Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).  The closest exception  is provided
by Hallstrom v.  Tillamook County, 493 U.S.  20 (1989).  But, in Hallstrom, the Court
granted certiorari (489 U.S. 1077 (1989)) only after asking the Solicitor General of the
United States about the advisability of granting review (see 488 U.S. 811 (1989))  and
then only after the United States filed a brief both advising the Court to hear the case
on the  merits  and to  rule  against  the  environmental  petitioners  (see Brief for  the
United States  as Amicus  Curiae in Hallstrom v.  Tillamook County, No.  88-42 (filed
February  17,  1989)), which the Court then did.
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found hundreds  of violations  occurring over many years. 1 0 1  The
violations,  moreover,  involve  discharges  of mercury;  not  sub-
stances  seemingly  innocuous  to  a layperson  or to  a lay Justice.
Mercury  is  a  highly toxic  subsistence  that persists, rather  than
degrades,  in  the  natural  environment.'0 2  The  record  further
shows that the district court imposed a hefty fine  of several hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, after finding that the company had
enjoyed an economic benefit of over one million dollars because  of
those violations.'
0 3
A Justice seeking to erect mootness or other Article III barri-
ers  to citizen suit enforcement  would  look for a case with a very
different  record.  Far preferable  would be a  case  involving  more
seemingly innocuous pollutants, 0 4 in order to both bolster possi-
ble suggestions  of the frivolousness  of the lawsuit and the lack of
necessity for citizen suit enforcement overall.  Finally, no clear cir-
cuit conflict was presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari
because  the Fourth  Circuit relied  upon  a recent  Supreme  Court
ruling, The Steel Co. v.  Citizens for a Better Environment, not yet
considered in this identical context by other circuits.
Of course, four votes do not a majority make.  The necessary
five-vote  majority  for  the environmental  plaintiffs  in Friends of
the Earth seems clearly in reach, however, in light of the Justices'
past voting record.  In particular, at least two Justices,  Kennedy
and  O'Connor,  seem  quite  open  to the environmental  plaintiffs
contention that the lower court misapplied mootness doctrine.  Ar-
ticle III jurisdictional requirements is an area where both Justices
have written and/or joined  separate  opinions that reflect greater
awareness  of the  need for legal doctrine to  evolve  in  response to
the special concerns raised by the demands of environmental pro-
tection.  Justice O'Connor actually dissented in Lujan v. Defenders
101.  See 956  F. Supp. at 600-01.
102.  See  ROBERT  V. PERCIVAL,  ET  AL.,  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION-LAw,  Sci-
ENCE,  &  POLICY 475  (1996).
103.  See id. at 610-11,  613.
104.  For example, some in the environmental community strongly urged the envi-
ronmental  plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.  Magnesium
Elektron, Inc.,  123  F.3d  111  (3d Cir.  1997)  not  to  seek Supreme  Court review.  Al-
though environmentalists  were unanimously of the view that the Third Circuit's rul-
ing  on standing  in Magnesium Elektron was  very harmful,  legally  erroneous,  and
could  form  the basis  of a strong petition  for a writ of certiorari,  there was far less
agreement  on  the essential  strategic  inquiry whether  the  case presented  the  facts
needed  to make  that legal  argument  in the  strongest possible  light.  A substantial
proportion  of the  alleged  violations  of the  Clean  Water Act  at issue  involved  dis-
charges  of salt and heat.  See id.  at  115.
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of Wildlife, and joined Blackmun's  opinion, which denounced the
majority  for  its  "slash and  burn"  of the  law  of environmental
standing.'0 5  Kennedy,  the  current  bellwether  Justice  for deter-
mining the majority ruling,1 0 6 joined most of the majority opinion
in that  same  case, but he also wrote  separately  to  stress,  along
with  Justice  Souter,  how  environmental  protection  concerns
might justify  Congress'  allowance  of less  concrete  injuries  and
more attenuated  chains of causation without offending Article III
of the Constitution. 
0 7
Were  both Justices  Kennedy  and O'Connor to fashion a ma-
jority with Justices Stevens,  Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg on the
issues before the Court in Friends  of the Earth, the resulting opin-
ion could  begin to restore what  makes  environmental  law "envi-
ronmental."  The  Court  could  acknowledge  that  environmental
protection  concerns  warrant rethinking  the way that Article  III
standing and mootness requirements  are understood  and applied.
At the very least, the case represents  an all-too-rare opportunity
for the Court to take a positive step in that direction.'08
105.  504 U.S. at  606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106.  See supra note  16 to  21 and accompanying  text.
107.  See 504 U.S. at 580 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains  of causation that will give  rise  to  a case  or  controversy where  none  existed
before.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108.  Subsequent events reveal that such a positive step has now been taken.  The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Friends of the Earth on March  1, 1999  (see
525 U.S. 1176 (1999)),  which was a few days before the delivery of this Garrison Lec-
ture.  The case was argued in October  1999, several  months after the written manu-
script for publication  was  complete.  On January  12,  2000, just as  this  article was
going to final press, the Court announced  its decision in the case.  See Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,  Inc.,  120 S.  Ct. 693 (2000).  As anticipated,
the  Court  rejected  the  Fourth Circuit's  mootness  ruling.  See  120  S.  Ct.  693,  697
(1999).  The Court, moreover, also rejected Laidlaw's  effort to defend  the court of ap-
peals' judgment on the alternative ground that Friends of the Earth lacked Article III
standing.  See id.  The Court rejected Laidlaw's contention that a citizen suit plaintiff
must demonstrate  actual injury  to the natural  environment.  The  Court ruled that
injury to the environment is not  the relevant  inquiry for standing,  which should in-
stead be  whether the plaintiff has been injured.  According  to the Court, moreover,
Friends of the Earth had established such injury by establishing that their members'
reasonable concerns  about the possible effects of the unlawful discharges had affected
adversely  their willingness to use the waterway at issue.  See id. at 698.  The Court
further ruled that, because  of their  future  deterrent effect,  civil penalties could pro-
vide sufficient redress for citizen suit standing purposes even when the defendant was
currently  in compliance  and those penalties  were  payable  exclusively to the federal
treasury.  See id.  The court's  opinion departs  significantly from some of the broader
implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environmental citi-
zen  suit plaintiffs,  discussed  in this article's  text.  Justice  Ginsburg  authored  the
Court's opinion, joined by  six others, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens,  O'Connor,  Kennedy,  Souter,  and Breyer.  Justice  Scalia filed  a dissenting
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IV.  Conclusion
Bringing the "environment" back to "environmental law" is, of
course, a long and not a short term undertaking.  Even a ruling in
a single case such as Friends  of the Earth v. Laidlaw is only that:
A single ruling in a single case.  It is a far cry from a reversal of
the trend disfavoring environmental protection that is apparent in
the Court's decisions during the past three  decades.
Nor will the longer term restoration, now warranted, occur as
a result ultimately of the efforts  of environmental  lawyers of my
generation,  or the efforts  of David Sive, Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers,  or
Ollie Houck.  It  will depend largely on the future efforts of today's
law students, such as those here at Pace and at other law schools,
who are about to embark on a career in environmental law.
Environmental lawyers  of my generation found inspiration in
the work of those who came  before us, including  Lloyd Garrison.
All  I can hope for is that today's  law students include  some who
will find the necessary inspiration in the work of those within my
own generation of environmental  lawyers  and scholars; that they
will be thoughtful, strategic advocates for environmental law's im-
portant  goals,  and  that they  will  work  towards  environmental
law's restoration in our nation's highest court.
Appendix
Environmental Cases Decided By The United States
Supreme Court
October Term 1969- October Term 1998
Cite  Name**  Year Decided
397 U.S.  88  Arkansas v. Tennessee  1970
397 U.S.  620  Choctaw Nation  v. Oklahoma  1970
400 U.S. 48  Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.  1970
401 U.S.  402  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.  1971
Volpe
401 U.S. 493  Ohio v.  Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.  1971
401  U.S.  520  United States v. District Court  in and for  1971
the County  of Eagle
opinion,  which Justice Thomas joined.  The  favorable outcome  in the Supreme Court
would  seem  to confirm the wisdom  of the environmentalist  strategy  of not seeking
review in earlier cases presenting  far less favorable  facts.  See note  104, supra.
**  Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring.
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401 U.S.  527
402 U.S.  159
402 U.S.  558
403 U.S.
405 U.S.
406 U.S.
406 U.S.
406 U.S.
409 U.S.
409 U.S.
410 U.S.  73
410 U.S.  641
410 U.S.  719
410 U.S.  743
411 U.S.  325
411 U.S.  624
411 U.S.  655
412 U.S.  481
412 U.S.  541
412 U.S.  580
412 U.S.  669
414 U.S.  44
414 U.S.
415 U.S.
416 U.S.
416 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
United States v. District Court in and for
Water Division No.  5
United States v. Southern Ute Tribe of
Band of Indians
United States v.  Int'l Minerals  & Chem.
Corp.
Utah v. United States
Sierra Club v.  Morton
Illinois v. Milwaukee
Washington v. General  Motors Corp.
Nebraska v.  Iowa
United States v. Jim
Farmers Elevator  & Warehouse  Co. v.
United States
Environmental Protection  Agency  v.  Mink
Ohio v. Kentucky
Salyer Land Co. v.  Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist.
Associated Enterprises  Inc. v.  Toltec
Watershed Improvement Dist.
Askew v. American Waterway  Operators
City of Burbank v. Lockheed  Air
Terminal Inc.
United States v.  Pennsylvania  Indus.
Chem. Corp.
Mattz v. Arnett
Fri v.  Sierra Club
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co.
United States v.  Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures
Dep't of Game  of the State  of Washington
v. The Puyallup Tribe
Bonelli Cattle  Co. v. Arizona
Mississippi v. Arkansas
Village  of Belle Terre v. Boraas
Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado
v.  Western Alfalfa Corp.
Train v.  City of New York
Train v.  Campaign  Clean Water, Inc.
Antoine  v. Washington
Utah v. United  States
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal
Power Comm'n
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972
1972
1972
1972
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
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420  U.S.
420  U.S.
420 U.S.
421 U.S.
421 U.S.  240
422  U.S.  13
422  U.S.  184
422  U.S. 289
424  U.S. 295
425  U.S.
426  U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
426 U.S.
427 U.S. 246
427 U.S. 390
429 U.S. 363
430 U.S.  112
431 U.S. 99
431 U.S.
434 U.S.
435 U.S.
435 U.S.
436 U.S. 371
436 U.S.  604
437 U.S.  153
United States  v. Maine
United States  v. Louisiana
United States  v. Florida
Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.  The
Wilderness Soc'y
United States  v. Louisiana
United States  v. Alaska
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students
Challenging  Regulatory Agency
Procedures
Alamo Land & Cattle  Co. v. State  of
Arizona
Northern  Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast
Train v.  Colorado Public Interest Group
Cappaert v.  United States
Hancock v.  Train
Environmental  Protection  Agency  v.
California  ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Bd.
New Hampshire  v. Maine
Texas  v.  Louisiana
Kleppe v.  New Mexico
Flint Ridge Dev. Co.  v. Scenic Rivers
Ass'n
Union Electric  Co.  v. Environmental
Protection Agency
Kleppe v. Sierra Club
Oregon  ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis
E I DuPont de Nemours v.  Train
Environmental  Protection  Agency  v.
Brown
Douglas v. Seacoast Products,  Inc.
Adamo Wrecking  Co. v. United  States
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield  Co.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural  Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Baldwin v.  Fish & Game Comm'n of
Montana
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products
Co.
Tennessee Valley Auth. v.  Hill
1975
1975
1975
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1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
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1976
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1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
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1978
1978
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1978
1978
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Hughes v. Oklahoma
Andrus v.  Sierra Club
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Washington v. Washington  State
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Ass'n
Andrus v. Allard
Kaiser Aetna v.  United States
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Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc.
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Ohio v. Kentucky
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Costle v. Pacific Legal  Found.
United States v. Clarke
United States v. Mitchell
Andrus v. Idaho
United States v. Louisiana
Andrus v. Utah
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.
Andrus v.  Shell Oil Co.
United States v. California
California v. Nevada
Agins v. City of Tiburon
Bryant v. Yellen
United States v.  Ward
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians
Indus. Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst.
Environmental  Protection  Agency  v.
National Crushed Stone Ass'n
State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
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1978
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450 U.S.  621
451 U.S.  259
451 U.S.  287
452 U.S.  264
452 U.S.  314
453 U.S.  1
453 U.S.  490
453 U.S.  609
454 U.S.  139
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